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CALLING ON U.S. COURTS TO ADOPT 




In the United States, courts have been divided between the 
new-textualist and purposive approaches to statutory 
interpretation, although currently the new-textualist approach 
appears to dominate.1 This paper encourages courts using either 
approach to consider adopting the “unified textual, contextual 
and purposive approach to statutory interpretation”2 (also 
referred to as the “words-in-total-contexts approach”3), as it has 
been developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years.  
* LL.B., London School of Economics. LL.M.–Taxation, London School of Economics. 
LL.M.–International Tax, University of Michigan Law School. S.J.D. candidate, University 
of Michigan Law School. This paper is dedicated to my parents, Jacob and Zina Pichhadze.
 1. See e.g. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1761–
62 (2010). 
2. Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22 
(quoting Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., 2005 SCC, ¶ 47) (emphasis added). 
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2 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
NEW TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVE APPROACHES
The common objective of all approaches to statutory 
interpretation is “to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent 
wherever possible.”4 This common objective is typically 
referred to as a cardinal rule of interpretation. The approaches 
differ, however, in their conception of the legislative intent as 
well as in their method of ascertaining that intent. And the 
various ways in which to interpret statutes all fit within the 
broad categories of either the textualist or the purposive 
approach.5
The legal systems of the past were usually dominated by a 
“word-oriented (i.e. objective) approach” to interpretation.6 This 
objective approach, which is broadly referred to in the United 
States as textualism, is based on the plain-meaning rule. 
Textualism has evolved over time from the traditional approach 
(commonly referred to as old textualism), which relies on a soft 
plain-meaning rule, to the more recent new textualism, which 
relies on a hard plain-meaning rule.7
According to the traditional textualist approach, the goal of 
statutory interpretation was to identify and give effect to the 
intent and purpose of the enacting Congress based on the plain 
meaning of the statutory text, derived by using the aid of 
dictionaries and generally accepted conceptions of ordinary 
parlance.8 Yet, the courts using this approach would also consult 
4. Bankers Trust of S.C. v. Bruce, 267 S.E.2d 424, 425 (S.C. 1980). 
 5. See e.g. Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law chs. 7, 8 (Princeton U. 
Press 2005). 
 6. Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition 621 (Oxford U. Press 1996).   
 7. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 
(1990) (discussing history of textualism).   
 8. Id. at 626–27 (noting that the Warren and Burger Courts often consulted legislative 
history to confirm that Congress intended particular statutory language to have its plain 
meaning); see also John J. Dichello Jr., Student Author, Crossing Textualist Paths: An 
Analysis of the Proper Textualist Interpretation of “Use” under Section 3B1.4 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines for “Using” a Minor to Commit a Crime, 107 
Dickinson L. Rev. 359, 363 (2002) (referring to “competing textualist interpretations set 
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3
the legislative history9 in order to check for evidence of 
congressional intention inconsistent with the intention conveyed 
by the plain meaning of the words.10 If such inconsistency is 
found, then under this traditional approach, “the plainest 
meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history.”11
This result, which led to characterizations of the old textualists’ 
reliance on the statute’s plain meaning as soft, was exemplified 
by cases such as INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca12 and TVA v. Hill.13
By the 1980s, the traditional textualist approach attracted 
significant criticism,14 which influenced some members of the 
United States Supreme Court—notably Justice Scalia—to 
increasingly replace the old textualism with a new approach. 
This new textualism “favors understanding the text the way a 
reasonable reader would have read it at the time it was enacted,” 
and its adherents’ goal “is not to discover . . . what the 
legislature wanted, but rather what it said.”15 Indeed, if asked 
how a court—presumed to embody the reasonable person16—
should ascertain the intention conveyed by the plain meaning of 
a statute, the new textualists’ reply is that judges “must study the 
language of the text as a whole, and if the statute is plain, they 
should give it its plain meaning”; that “[t]hey may also consult 
dictionaries and linguistic aids to equip themselves with 
information about how readers understood the statute at the time 
of its enactment”; and that “[t]hey may consult interpretive 
maxims in effect at the time of enactment.”17 New textualists 
 9. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 636–37 (indicating that extrinsic sources from which courts 
reconstruct legislative history could vary considerably, through different weight would be 
given to sources depending on their perceived reliability, and noting that Congressional 
committee reports are frequently cited and relied on because they are generally regarded as 
reliable and authoritative). 
 10. Id. at 627.
 11. Id. at 626 (suggesting that this override is the essence of the soft plain-meaning 
approach).
 12. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  
 13. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  
 14. See e.g. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 642–50 (summarizing realist, historicist, and 
formalist critiques).
15. Barak, supra n. 5, at 277. 
16. See e.g. Vector Gas Ltd. v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, [2010] NZSC 5, ¶ 19 
(Tipping, J.) (noting that a court “embodies” the “reasonable and properly informed third 
party” whose understanding of language should control).  
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4 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
believe in addition that “a text cannot be understood out of 
context,” and “permit interpreters to consult other statutes 
passed by the legislature, in order to draw inferences from the 
legislature’s use of similar language.”18 They do not, however, 
“allow interpreters to consult legislative history or the system’s 
fundamental values as they existed at the time of 
interpretation.”19 Thus, “[e]ven when the plain language leads to 
absurdity, or when the language is unclear, interpreters may not 
consult legislative history or fundamental values,” and “have no 
choice but to say that the issue lies beyond the reach of the 
statute”20 if they are acting in accordance with new-textualist 
principles.
Therefore, reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text 
has moved farther toward the hard end of the analytic scale 
under the new-textualist approach.21 Not only will judges who 
follow this approach not replace the plain meaning of terms with 
a constructed legislative intent based on the legislative history, 
they will not even consider the legislative history unless the 
statutory terms are ambiguous or absurd, or if their plain 
meaning seems unreasonable.22 As the Supreme Court of the 
United States has held, 
[t]he preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires 
us to “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.” . . . Thus, 
our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as 
well if the text is unambiguous.23
Some judges have, however, resorted to the purposive 
approach to interpretation, which requires the court to ascertain 
and give effect to the actual intention of Congress.24 Justice 
Breyer, for example, acknowledges that judges “should not 
18. Id. at 278–79.  
 19. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id.
 21. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 656–67; see also Congressional Research Service, Statutory 
Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 3 (Aug. 31, 2008) (recognizing that 
“the Court has begun to place more emphasis on statutory text and less emphasis on 
legislative history and other sources ‘extrinsic’ to that text”). 
 22. Eskridge, supra n. 7, at 658–59.
23. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citations omitted); see also
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Bedroc).  
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5
substitute” their own policy views “for the statute that Congress 
enacted,”25 but takes the position that the Court’s members 
“certainly should consider Congress’ view of the policy for the 
statute it created” and should remember that the legislators’ 
view “inheres in the statute’s purpose.”26 He notes that 
“[s]tatutory interpretation is not a game of blind man’s bluff,” 
concluding that “[j]udges are free to consider statutory language 
in light of a statute’s basic purposes.”27
This focus on ascertaining the actual intentions of the 
enacting Congress results in a “willingness to consider an array 
of extrinsic interpretative aids, including legislative history.”28
Moreover, a purposivist would “generally feel freer to go 
beyond the confines of statutory text and will not necessarily 
find that text trumps contradictory evidence of purpose.”29
III. THE APPROACH TO CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A DIFFERENT TREND
The cardinal rule that guides statutory interpretation—
intent—also guides the interpretation of contracts.30 Not 
surprisingly, the question of how to approach the interpretation 
of the parties’ intention in a contract has also been debated. At 
one end of the debate were advocates—most notable being 
Professor Williston—of the plain-meaning approach, which 
resembles textualism. At the other end of the debate were 
advocates—most notable being Professor Corbin—of the 
modern approach, which resembles the purposive approach.
25. Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 
2326, 2343 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 
468, 484 (2003)). 
 26. Id.
 27. Id.
28. Gluck, supra n. 1, at 1764. 
29. Id.
30. See e.g. Vision Info. Servs., LLC. v. C.I.R., 419 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Pickren v. U.S., 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967): “The cardinal rule in the 
interpretation of contract is to ascertain the mutual intention of the parties and then, so far 
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6 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
A. Williston 
According to Williston, the courts must ascertain and give 
effect to the objectively manifested intentions of the parties, as 
they were conveyed by the terms of the contract, either 
expressly or by implication.31 To clarify, the objective intentions 
are those that a reasonable person would have identified based 
on the plain meaning of the terms of the contract.32 Hence, 
Williston believed that a court should not be concerned with the 
parties’ actual subjective intentions, except to the extent that 
those were objectively manifested through the terms of the 
contract. Where, however, the parties’ intentions could not be 
derived from the plain meaning of the terms, Williston 
instructed judges 
to use “secondary” canons of interpretation, which did not 
inquire as to the actual intent of the parties, but instead 
reflected generalizations about the use of language and 
judicially-created normative views about how contracts 
ought to be drafted.33
Because this approach is focused on ascertaining and 
giving effect to intentions that are objectively manifested by the 
plain meaning of the terms of the contract, extrinsic evidence 
should not be admissible “to prove the actual intent of the 
parties.”34 It is the intent conveyed by the terms that must be 
ascertained and given effect.
B. Corbin 
In contrast to Williston, Corbin argued that the courts must 
ascertain and give effect to the parties’ actual subjective intent. 
 31. Stephen R. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its 
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195, 197 (1998). 
 32. Id.
33. Id. at 201 (footnote omitted). Those secondary canons included “construe so as not 
to conflict with the main purpose of the contract; pay attention to grammar and 
punctuation; the specific governs the general; construe against the drafter; written matter 
trumps printed matter; and prior clauses trump latter clauses.” Id. at 201 n. 25 (noting in 
addition that “Williston also employed the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis (words 
should be given a meaning consistent with surrounding words) . . . a technique common to 
statutory interpretation as well”).  
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 7
To ascertain their actual intentions, the court must take into 
account not only the terms of the contract (i.e. terms within the 
four corners of the agreement that make up the agreement’s 
internal contexts) but also extrinsic evidence of the agreement’s 
relevant external contexts (commonly referred to as its “factual 
matrix,” “matrix of facts,” and “surrounding circumstances”) 
irrespective of whether the contractual terms were ambiguous.35
There has been a growing gravitation in the United States 
towards this modern approach to contractual interpretation. The 
California courts, for example, were early adopters,36 and the 
modern purposive approach has been embraced by the 
Restatement as well.37
C. The Implications for Statutory Interpretation 
One commentator has noted that “American law is ready to 
consult authorial intent in contracts and wills,” and wondered 
why it is “unwilling to do so for statutes and for the 
Constitution.”38 The analysis that follows addresses this inquiry 
by (i) distinguishing statutory interpretation from contractual 
interpretation and (ii) demonstrating that statutory interpretation 
requires the flexibility of a unified textual, contextual, and 
purposive approach rather than either a textual or purposive 
approach alone.
35. Id. at 203–05. 
 36. The California trend was apparent by the late 1960s. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v G. 
W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (“If words had absolute 
and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words 
themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have 
absolute and constant referents.”). 
 37. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b (ALI 1981) (providing that “[a]ny 
determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in light of the relevant 
evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, 
preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of 
dealing between the parties”). 
38. Barak, supra n. 5, at 277. Others have of course explored this same question. See 
e.g. Ross & Tranen, supra n. 31, at 199, 222 (arguing that there is a “strong analogy 
between contract and statutory interpretation” and concluding accordingly that an approach 
akin to the modern purposive approach to contractual interpretation—and not the new 
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8 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Recall that the interpretation of both statutes and contracts 
is driven by the same cardinal objective of giving effect to the 
authors’ intentions. Notwithstanding this common objective, 
however, courts must be mindful that different instruments serve 
distinctive functions and have distinctive characteristics, which 
may necessitate different approaches to interpretation.39 The 
interpretation of commercial contracts necessitates ascertaining 
the historical intentions of the parties. In contrast, the 
interpretation of statutes may, depending on how the terms of a 
statutory provision have been phrased, necessitate ascertaining 
the historical intentions of the legislature or, alternatively, may 
necessitate having the court apply a dynamic interpretation. 
These dual functions of courts require the flexibility of a unified 
textual, contextual, and purposive approach to interpretation.  
A. Interpretation of Contracts: Theory and Mechanics 
When parties negotiate the terms of their commercial 
contract, they—presumably—are not intending to leave it up to 
the courts to sort out and apply some broad policy objectives. 
Rather, they—presumably—rely on having a court give effect to 
their bargain, though the court may be expected to try to resolve 
inadequacies in how the terms have been expressed in order to 
give effect to the contract. Thus, the court’s “task is to discover 
what the parties meant from what they have said,” without 
imposing on the contract’s words “a meaning which they cannot 
fairly bear,” because the latter would be “to substitute for the 
bargain actually made one which the court believes could better 
have been made.”40 The court must remember, then, that 
[p]articularly in the field of commerce, where the parties 
need to know what they must do and what they can insist 
on not doing, it is essential for [the parties] to be confident 
39. See e.g. Barak, supra n. 5, at 185. 
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9
that they can rely on the court to enforce their bargain 
according to its terms.41
It can therefore be asserted that generally, when 
interpreting a commercial contract, the function of the court is 
confined to ascertaining the parties’ historical intention as it 
existed when the parties entered into the contract. One 
commentator eloquently described this historical intention as 
“permanently set,” and noted that it “can never be changed with 
the passage of time” because “[t]he interpreter’s role resembles 
that of an historian, or an archeologist, in quest of an ancient 
thought of which the enactment may contain traces.”42
B. Interpretation of Statutes: Theory and Mechanics 
Unlike parties to contracts, legislators often pursue their 
objectives in statutes by means of, on the one hand, specific and 
detailed rules and, on the other hand, vague rules or policies. 
This paradox is exemplified by statutory regimes around the 
world that are designed to combat tax-avoidance transactions. It 
is commonplace for countries to have Specific Anti-Avoidance 
Rules (SAARs),43 and increasingly, countries have also been 
introducing General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs). Whereas 
a SAAR applies to a specific and defined type of transaction, the 
GAAR will set a vague standard of what constitutes tax 
avoidance, and this standard could apply to a wide and open-
ended spectrum of unforeseeable transactions. 
In Canada, for example, a transaction is an “avoidance 
transaction” if, but for section 245 of the Income Tax Act, it 
“would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit.”44 When 
the Minister of National Revenue alleges that a transaction is an 
avoidance transaction as set out in section 245(3), the burden is 
on the taxpayer to prove otherwise on the basis that the 
transaction can “reasonably be considered to have been 
 41. Id.
 42. Randal N. Graham, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 Statute L. Rev. 
91, 93 (2002) (quoting Pierre André Coté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada 6 
(2d ed. Editions Yvon Blais, Inc. 1992)). 
 43. For more about SAARs, see Brian M. Studniberg, Minding the Gap in Tax 
Interpretation: Does Specificity Oust the General Anti-Avoidance Rule Post-Copthorne? 38 
Queen’s L.J. 209 (2012). 
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10 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other 
than to obtain the tax benefit.”45 If the taxpayer fails to prove 
that the transaction is not an “avoidance transaction,” then the 
Minister has the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, 
that the avoidance transaction would result in an abuse or misuse 
(either directly or indirectly) of a provision in any of the 
instruments specified in section 245(4), which includes the 
ITA.46  If the Minister fails in this task, the taxpayer would not 
be denied the tax benefit even though the transaction was an 
avoidance transaction.47 But if the Minister proves that the 
avoidance transaction resulted in misuse or abuse of the relevant 
provision, then the taxpayer can be denied the tax benefits from 
the transaction.48
What constitutes “misuse” or “abuse”? The approach to 
determining whether a transaction results in a misuse or abuse 
for the purposes of section 245(4) was explained by the SCC in 
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen.49
Commentators have criticized the rule as being too vague,50 a 
critique that is equally relevant to other GAARs around the 
world.51
 45. Id.
 46. Lipson v. R., [2009] 1 SCR 3, 2009 SCC 1 (CanLII), ¶ 21. 
 47. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 48. Income Tax Act, pt. XVI, § 245(2).
 49. [2005] 2 SCR 601, 2005 SCC 54 (CanLII), ¶ 44 (making clear that courts should 
use “a contextual and purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act that are relied 
on” by first determining  “their object, spirit and purpose,” and then determining “whether 
the transaction falls within or frustrates that purpose”). 
 50. See e.g. Brian J. Arnold, The Canadian Experience with a General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule 3 (Oxford U. Centre for Business Taxation 2007) (discussing abuse standard 
articulated in § 245, and arguing that it should apply even when an abuse is inserted into a 
series of legitimate transactions). 
 51. See e.g. Ltr. from William J. Sampl, Chair, Taxn. Comm., U.S. Council for Intl. 
Bus., to Ram Mohan Singh, Additional Dir. of Income Tax–Intl. Taxn., IRS (India), http:// 
www.uscib.org/docs/Final_letter_GAAR_7_19_12.pdf (July 19, 2012) (cautioning India’s 
IRS that provisions in its proposed GAAR guidelines are “extraordinarily broad” and “too 
vague”) (accessed Aug. 1, 2014; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). As India’s proposed GAAR is set to come into effect in April 2015, some argue 
that this move should be deferred and rethought. See Pravin Agrawal and Namrata Arora, 
Budget 2014–15: What Corporate India Wants, on TaxIndiaOnline.com, http://www.tax 
indiaonline.com/RC2/inside2.php3?filename=bnews_detail.php3&newsid=20874 (July 9, 
2014) (“There are many provisions under GAAR that may be considered vague and 
unclear. If clear guidelines are not put in place, it would lead to uncertainty in the tax 
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11
In statutes, this use of vague statements or words is 
unlikely to be the result of bad draftsmanship. Rather, vagueness 
is likely an intentional tool of draftsmanship by which the 
legislature invites—or relies on—the courts to assume an 
interpretative role that is more dynamic then that presumably 
expected from the courts by parties to a commercial contract. 
This sort of dynamic interpretation “permits the interpreter to 
select a construction that fits with current needs and departs 
from historical expectations” while also permitting the court to 
mould interpretation of the statute
in response to “needs which are identified at the time the 
rule is being applied, either with reference to the current 
rather than the historic will of the legislature, or with 
respect to what the interpreter considers is dictated under 
the circumstances.”52
This view of legislation assumes that “statutory language must 
grow and adapt in response to changing social conditions . . .  
[and] views the author’s intent as merely one (marginally 
relevant) element of construction” because “[t]he drafters’ 
understanding of the statute” is “merely one potential 
construction.”53 Thus, “[a]s time passes and the text is applied to 
new situations, the statute’s meaning adapts to become 
something more than what the drafters first intended.”54
To emphasize, dynamic interpretation of a statute is 
typically triggered, or prompted, by the legislature’s use of 
vague language.55 But the use of vague language in statutory 
immediate step the implementation of GAAR needs to be deferred and the provisions could 
be rolled out later after suitable appraisal and discussions.”) (accessed Aug. 1, 2014; copy 
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
52. Graham, supra n. 42, at 105 (quoting Coté, supra n. 42). 
 53. Id.
 54. Id. In the same vein, Professor Eskridge has written about several examples of the 
manner in which dynamic interpretation can cause a statute to grow in ways that conflict 
with the drafters’ expectations. Perhaps his most striking example is the evolution of 
§ 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 51–52 (Harv. U. Press 1994). 
 55. Vagueness is of course distinguishable from ambiguity. “[W]here language leaves 
the interpreter with a choice between an easily ascertainable number of specific 
interpretative choices, the problem can be attributed to ambiguity. Where the language 
being interpreted leads to a broad continuum of meanings (giving rise to ‘marginal 
questions of degree’), the problem can be attributed to language that is vague.” Graham, 
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12 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
provisions “does not necessarily imply a lack of skill on the part 
of the statute’s drafters.”56  Indeed, by employing vague 
language, the legislature may be “sending signals to the courts 
that should help the judiciary select the appropriate method of 
resolving interpretative problems” because 
vague language may actually imply that the legislature’s 
intent (which is the touchstone of originalist construction) 
was to permit the use of dynamic interpretation and to 
acknowledge the role of judicial “creativity” in the 
construction and application of legislation.57
Consider, for example, these four situations in which a 
legislature may choose vague language: 
When drafting a statute “involves hard political 
choices, vagueness may be employed as an 
expedient drafting tool to delay the choices by 
remitting them to future judicial construction”;58
When it is the legislature’s intention “to grant 
discretion to the courts and other officials charged 
with the task of administering legislation,” vague 
language may appear in a statute because “[o]nly a 
rough idea of the legislature’s meaning has been 
established, with the details left to be worked out 
by the courts or administrative officials”;59
When a legislature seeks “to delegate its powers to 
judicial or administrative bodies” because its 
members “recognize their own inability to predict 
the practical ramifications of legislation” and know 
that “the members of the judiciary (or other 
individuals charged with administering and 
enforcing legislation) often have the experience and 
the knowledge that are required to apply vague 
 56. Id.
 57. Id. at 122. 
 58. Id.
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13
statutory language in a manner that is appropriate,” 
vague language may be a proper choice;60 and
When drafters intend to “permit the language of an 
enactment to take on a life of its own,” an 
alternative ignored by originalists, who fail to 
account for “the possibility that the framers were 
content to leave the detailed application . . . to the 
courts of the future,” even knowing that those 
courts might “apply the text in ways unanticipated 
at the time of drafting.”61
V. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA: THE GAAR AS ILLUSTRATION
Parliament’s use in § 245(4) of the terms “misuse” and 
“abuse,”62 which set a vague standard of what constitutes tax 
avoidance, appears to have been for the purpose of delegating 
the task of filling in the legislative blanks to the judiciary. That 
is, the GAAR makes it possible for legislatures to defer to the 
courts the task of determining, on a case-by-case basis, the 
circumstances in which a transaction amounts to misuse or 
abuse. Parliament benefits from having the courts exercise this 
role because it is not possible for the legislature to anticipate 
every possible variation of tax-avoidance schemes.63
 60. Id. To illustrate this point, Professor Graham points out that “disturbing the peace is 
not defined” in the Criminal Code, and neither does it “describe how one could disturb the 
peace in a ‘tumultuous’ manner.” He concludes in consequence that “[i]n instances such as 
these, the drafter has used an extremely broad term for the purpose of delegating the task of 
filling in the ‘legislative blanks’ to the judiciary.” He posits legislators’ understanding that 
“[j]udges are able to determine what ‘disturbs the peace tumultuously’ because of their 
great experience adjudicating offences against the public order,” and suggests that “[t]he 
legislature, by contrast, has neither the expertise nor the inclination to define these vague 
terms with specificity.” Thus, “[t]hrough the use of the vague language found in such 
provisions, the legislature acknowledges the judiciary’s expertise and grants the courts the 
discretion to apply and interpret the law as they see fit.” Id.
 61. Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. For a general discussion of Canada’s GAAR, see section IV(B), supra.
 63. See e.g. Aviv Pichhadze & Amir Pichhadze, Economic Substance Doctrine: Time 
for a Legislative Response, 48 Tax Notes Intl. 61 (Oct. 1, 2007); see also Rebecca Prebble 
& John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance 
Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study, 55 St. Louis U. L.J. 29 
(2010). The bottom line is that had Parliament known of a particular scheme in advance, it 
could have responded by enacting a SAAR. The GAAR’s broad language could be seen as 
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14 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
It should not be assumed, however, that courts will 
necessarily engage in dynamic interpretation just because a 
statutory provision is phrased vaguely. With respect to the 
GAAR, for example, numerous commentators have argued that 
for the GAAR to be effective it should apply to any transaction 
that lacks economic substance, even though the transaction was 
carried out using a valid legal form. One expert maintains, for 
example, that “[a]ny GAAR or general anti-avoidance doctrine 
must consider the economic substance of transaction[s] if it is to 
be effective.”64 Another opines that the economic-substance 
doctrine “offers the best standard for drawing the line between 
legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance.”65 The 
application of this economic-substance doctrine is not novel. It 
has already been applied in several jurisdictions. Most notably, 
the United States Supreme Court articulated the doctrine as far 
back as 1935.66 In Canada, though, the ITA does not explicitly 
specify whether a transaction that lacks economic substance 
amounts to an abusive tax-avoidance transaction. Due to the 
GAAR’s vagueness, this question would have to be determined 
by the courts.
The SCC’s first opportunity to address this question was in 
Canada Trustco,67 in which the SCC could have applied the 
economic-substance doctrine through judicial statutory 
interpretation.68 This possibility led to great anticipation. Yet, 
despite Parliament’s vague language, which may be seen to have 
invited the courts to read into § 245 the requirement of 
economic substance, the SCC refrained from such dynamic 
interpretation. Even though the Explanatory Notes demonstrate a 
legislative intention that the GAAR is intended to ensure that the 
provisions of the ITA will “apply to transactions with real 
economic substance, the Supreme Court held that economic 
substance is relevant under the GAAR only if the provisions in 
64. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 3. 
 65. Jinyan Li, “Economic Substance”: Drawing the Line between Legitimate Tax 
Minimization and Abusive Tax Avoidance, 54 Canadian Tax Journal 23, 56 (2006). 
 66. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935) (indicating that a taxpayer 
may attempt to decrease or avoid taxes but not to evade them, and characterizing the 
transaction before the Court as “devious” and concluding that it was “outside the plain 
intent of the statute”). 
 67. 2005 SCC 54. 
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 15
question contemplate or refer to economic substance.”69 In 
addition, “[v]ery few statutory provisions explicitly refer to 
economic substance,” and “lack of economic substance is only 
one factor to be considered and is insufficient by itself to 
establish abusive tax avoidance.”70 It seems in consequence that 
“economic substance is unlikely to be an important factor in the 
application of the GAAR if the Supreme Court’s approach is 
adhered to strictly by the lower courts.”71
As the above discussion reveals, the courts’ function in the 
construction of statutes may be more dynamic than it is in the 
construction of contracts, depending on how a statutory 
provision has been phrased. Indeed, contractual interpretation 
differs from statutory interpretation in that it is focused on 
analyzing language in order to ascertain and give effect to the 
intentions of the parties to the contract, while “constitutional and 
statutory interpretation are not so much about the meaning of 
language as about political debates over the proper role of the 
courts in a democracy.”72
This distinction has important implications for choosing an 
interpretative approach. In the construction of contracts the 
court’s function is to ascertain and give effect to the historical 
intentions of the parties. This necessitates a textual interpretation 
that focuses on the parties’ intentions as they were objectively 
conveyed (at the time the contract was concluded) through the 
plain meaning of the expressed terms (and, where relevant, also 
implied terms), read in light of their total context. Conversely, in 
69. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 4; see also Judith Freedman, Converging Tracks? Recent 
Developments in Canadian and UK Approaches to Tax Avoidance, 53 Canadian Tax J.
1038, 1039 (2005) (noting that “[o]ne might have expected that the GAAR would give a 
legislative signal to judges to be bold, but it seems to have had the opposite effect of 
making them all the more careful to protect the taxpayer”). 
 70. Arnold, supra n. 50, at 4.
 71. Id.
 72. Lord Hoffman, The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, 114. S. Afr. L.J. 
656, 672 (1997) (noting in addition that “disagreements between judges or between judges 
and academics over questions of statutory interpretation . . . arouse the most extraordinary 
passions,” and that “these disputes . . . are in essence political and concern the relationship 
between the judges and the legislature”); see also Geoff R. Hall, Canadian Contractual 
Interpretation Law 4 (LexisNexis Canada 2d ed. 2012) (quoting Hoffman, recognizing 
differences between the interpretation of contracts and the interpretation of statutes, and 
pointing out that judges involved in statutory interpretation can have “fundamental 
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the construction of statutes the courts’ function can vary. Where 
the legislature sets out specific and detailed rules and 
requirements, this presumably signals the legislature’s intention 
to have the statutory provision applied based on its plain 
meaning in order to give effect to the legislature’s historical 
intentions. As was explained by the SCC with respect to the 
interpretation of the ITA, “because of the degree of precision 
and detail characteristic of many tax provisions, a greater 
emphasis has often been placed on textual interpretation where 
taxation statutes are concerned.”73 Similarly, in Canada Trustco
the SCC stated that “[t]he Income Tax Act remains an 
instrument dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific 
consequences, inviting a largely textual interpretation.”74 On the 
other hand, where the legislature sets out vague rules and 
requirements, this presumably signals the legislature’s intention 
to have the statutory provision applied with judicial discretion 
by means of dynamic interpretation, which in turn would 
necessitate a more contextual and purposive interpretation. As 
was explained by the SCC, “where the words of a statute give 
rise to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ordinary 
meaning of words will play a lesser role, and greater recourse to 
the context and purpose of the Act may be necessary.”75 Again, 
this is exemplified by Canada’s GAAR. As the SCC recently 
noted, the GAAR is a “legal mechanism whereby” Parliament 
directs the court to go “behind the words of the legislation to 
determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or 
provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.”76 And sometimes, 
although the taxpayer’s transactions will be “in strict compliance 
with the text of the relevant provisions relied upon, they may not 
necessarily be in accord with their object, spirit or purpose.”77
Therefore, in comparison to the interpretation of 
commercial contracts, statutory construction requires greater 
flexibility, rather than limiting the courts to either textualist or 
purposive approaches. This flexibility can be achieved by 
following Canada’s unified approach, which requires the courts 
73. Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 21.
 74. 2005 SCC 54 at ¶ 13. 
75. Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22.
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CANADA’S APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17
to undertake a textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation.78
The degree of emphasis that will be placed on any of these 
factors—text, context, or general purpose—should, as the SCC 
explained, be informed by the level of precision and clarity with 
which the legislation has been drafted.79 As Justice Greenberg of 
Manitoba’s Court of Queen’s Bench recently explained, “the 
starting point in interpreting a statutory provision is the ordinary 
meaning of the words used but, except where the words are 
precise, one must consider the meaning of the words using a 
purposive and contextual analysis.”80
It is worthwhile to consider the SCC’s criticism in 
Singleton of an approach to statutory interpretation that focuses 
on either the extreme of a plain-meaning approach or the 
opposite extreme of a purposive interpretation (which it referred 
to as the teleological approach), and its explanation for choosing 
the middle ground made possible by the words-in-total-contexts 
approach. As Justice LeBel explained there, the teleological 
approach is problematic because starting from the statute’s 
purposes risks “obscuring the meaning of the particular statutory 
language” because of the court’s “enthusiasm to forward the 
general statutory purpose.”81 Instead, then, “[c]areful attention 
must always be taken to give effect to the particular language 
Parliament chose to use.”82
As for the plain-meaning approach, he wrote in Singleton
that “it surely cannot mean that we are always to ignore context 
when interpreting statutory language,” but “must be understood 
to say that although context is always important, sweeping 
considerations of general statutory purpose cannot outweigh the 
specific statutory language chosen by Parliament.”83 Justice 
LeBel continued by cautioning against “finding a single purpose 
for the Act as a whole and using it to interpret the clear language 
of specific provisions,” encouraging the Court to use those 
78. Placer Dome, 2006 SCC 20 at ¶ 22.
79. Id. at ¶ 23; see also Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1 at 
¶ 21 (quoting description of “precise and unequivocal” language from Canada Trustco).  
80. Bell ExpressVu Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), 2010 MBQB 26 at ¶ 27 (citing Placer 
Dome).
81. Singleton, 2001 SCC at ¶ 64.
 82. Id.
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general purposes “only as a context to help elucidate the 
meaning of the specific statutory language.”84 If used in this 
way, the plain-meaning approach “is not inconsistent with the 
basic thrust of the words-in-total-context approach.”85
Recognizing the words-in-total-context approach as the 
preferred method for analyzing statutory language, Justice LeBel 
characterized it as an analysis that “steers a middle course” 
between the teleological and plain-meaning approaches and 
allows a “more ‘open-textured’ approach to statutory 
interpretation.”86 Equally important, it “ensures that clear 
statutory language is not overlooked in order to carry out a 
broad statutory purpose more effectively.”87
V. CONCLUSION 
Statutory interpretation in the United States continues to be 
torn between the textualist and purposivist approaches, though 
the new-textualist approach has been gaining dominance. 
Commentators have argued that courts in the United States 
should focus their approach on either one of those extremes. In 
contrast, the SCC has, in recent years, opted for a middle ground 
by applying a unified textual, contextual, and purposive 
approach. This Canadian approach is preferable to the 
dichotomy seen in the United States because it provides the 
courts with the flexibility they require for statutory 
interpretation. Depending on how specific and technical a 
statutory provision’s phrasing, the Canadian approach enables 
the court to properly ascertain the legislature’s intentions, either 
by focusing on the legislature’s historical intentions or instead 
by applying a more dynamic interpretation. Courts in the United 
States should consider adopting this Canadian approach.
 84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. Id. (citation omitted). 
 87. Id. at ¶¶ 61–62. 
